Sean Spain responds to a recent article on HumanistLife with a novel solution to the ‘is-ought’ problem.
‘We will act compassionately towards one another. We will act fairly towards one another. We will be kind to one another.’ Photo: Jesslee Culzon.
I recently read an article by George Keeling, mounting a defence for humanist morality. The crux of the argument is that morality is the natural expression of advantageous evolutionary activities – ‘[That] moral passions exist to ensure co-operation and ultimately the perpetuation of our genes’. Social co-operation is the grounding of this morality, and can be seen to be advantageous to species across the animal kingdom. Man, it is argued, is a naturally social animal whose co-operative instinct has flourished into empathy which is unique to higher-functioning cognitive abilities. Thus the humanist morality stems from an inherent drive to treat others as they would be treated, and the humanist acknowledges this drive as his moral compass. Of course we can’t just rely on this drive to steer us all on the course to ethical action; instead we simply acknowledge the roots of our ‘disposition towards compassion, fairness and kindness’ and in doing so affirm the grounds upon which our value judgements stand.
I admire this value-compass for human action. In the reality around here, the humanist finds truth. In the world around her, she finds wonder; in the society around her, she is optimistic; in her intuition, and the knowledge of its emergence, she finds an ethical grounding.
But Ethics demands more from us than this. Co-operation may be advantageous to my survival, but that doesn’t necessarily make it ethically good. I may feel compassion towards the members of my group, but that won’t suffice to justify my command for others to not harm them. It can’t be good because it is: a statement which outlines what is can’t be used to logically deduce what ought to be. The two are different statements in kind and as such need a mediating principal as justification. Once this mediating principal is introduced (e.g. a utilitarian framework) then the ethical discourse becomes one of choosing X over why; and the mediating principal props up the ought – the is becomes redundant.
Hume realized this:
‘I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.’[1]
Translated, Hume observed that there is a jump in reason when one presents phenomena which is the case (i.e. co-operation, and empathy, are evolutionarily advantageous- and may even perhaps be argued to be the etymological roots of our notions of morality) and then deduces from it that what is the case ought to be. The justification of a moral proscription must be grounded in reasoning beyond just the description of events.
The burden of an ethical framework demands an external justification for the Ought. Plato grounded his idea of the ‘Good’ in a plane of the forms; religion finds good in ‘God’. Even philosophers like Kant, who have attempted to reposition the notion of what is good, systematically ground its value beyond themselves- in something absolute, and metaphysical. What is often forgotten in these ethical systems is the appeal to a position of value as something which is beyond the world as it is. They do this because they have to. Ethics demands a firm ground for value which must be more than a description of events, or relative in a mechanistic world-view.
But there is an alternative approach.
Wittgenstein realised this problem of value, and the implications which the value problem had for ethics and more fundamentally aesthetics.
In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein notes:
6.4 ‘All Propositions are of equal value.’[2] ( clarification: Truth propositions)
6.41 ‘…In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value – and if there were, it would be of no value.’[3]
6.42 ‘Hence there can be no ethical propositions.’[4]
A fact, what is, can’t have a value in itself. The values around us are valuable to us, not outside of us. The value of co-operation might be found in the benefits of an improved feeling of safety among each other; a personal satisfaction may be felt when an empathetic urge is fulfilled; we feel relief when our compassion for an individual in danger is rewarded with their safety. The value is a feeling. But ethics demands an external ground for this value to meet the requirements of absolutism. Thus throughout history we have tried to establish this value and in doing so have had to ground it in metaphysical postulations, or religious gods.
The problem is the ethical discourse itself.
The solution? Don’t try to defend morality. It’ll undermine your value system, and the values of your actions. Reject the discussion of ethics because it is misleading. We don’t need to rationally defend what is good. We feel it is good. It shows itself to be good. But the good we make use of isn’t some ethereal absolute – it is a dependent evaluation which is justified by our empathetic intuition and intellectual reasoning.
And the same purposes can be fulfilled. We will act compassionately towards one another. We will act fairly towards one another. We will be kind to one another.
And if you are asked to defend what someone else deems your morality, you can respond in the infamous words of Wittgenstein:
- ‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’.[5]
Sean Spain is an undergraduate student of Easter & Western Philosophy. He is primarily interested in the Philosophy of Language & Value- particularly in their application to ‘real-world’ events
Notes
[1] Hume, David ‘Treatise of Human Understanding’, end of section 3.1.1.
[2] Wittgenstein, Ludwig ‘Tractatus Logico-Philosohicus’, pp. 29-31.
[3] Ibid Wittgenstein, Ludwig
[4] Ibid Wittgenstein, Ludwig
[5] Ibid Wittgenstein, Ludwig
Hello,
A thoroughly enjoyable read, but I would like to propose an opposing position. I may have misunderstood what you have said as it was quite complex so correct me if I am wrong.
You suggest there can be no absolute ethical code as this would suggest an ethereal nature (a god some may argue). Is this right?
I agree with you on a purely semantic ground (Wittgenstein was nothing if not the King of semantics!), but I disagree on a Humanist philosophy ground.
The argument I take comes from Sam Harris in ‘The Moral Landscape’ which states that: “Morality and values depend on the existence of conscious minds—and specifically on the fact that such minds can experience various forms of well-being and suffering in this universe. Conscious minds and their states are natural phenomena, fully constrained by the laws of the universe (whatever these turn out to be in the end). Therefore, questions of morality and values must have right and wrong answers that fall within the purview of science (in principle, if not in practice). Consequently, some people and cultures will be right (to a greater or lesser degree), and some will be wrong, with respect to what they deem important in life.”
Taking this view we can say that there are absolute answers (peaks on the moral landscape) which may not be universal but in some sense they can be empirically quantifiable.
Taking this argument we can make the law for ourselves to treat all conscious creatures with love and compassion.
Steven Pinker takes this argument further stating that logic and compassion together are the bedrock of a continuing positive evolution of morality, in a way that I think sits with Harris’s argument. You can see Pinker’s argument from his TED talk here: http://www.ted.com/talks/steven_pinker_and_rebecca_newberger_goldstein_the_long_reach_of_reason
It is the best TED talk I have seen by far, and worth a watch. His book ‘The better angels of our nature’ is the extended version of his TED talk and is probably the best book I have ever read.
So I propose that there is an absolute morality, though in scientific terms, and we can work towards this using a sense of logic and compassion. In this sense, I wholly refute Wittgenstein as it is our value judgments that make up compassion and therefore morality itself.
Thanks
Graham
@think_damn_it
Hey Graham, thanks for your considered response!
I think the challenge with Sam’s position is that he asks you to permit him that well-being is in some sense related to value & the moral good.
From that point on he develops a cogent and quite modern account of a Utilitarian ethic.
The problem, however, is that it is the conflation of Value, Moral good & well-being which is in question. That has traditionally been what Ethicists have tried to figure out. Hence conflicting accounts of what is good: god=good; good is the best for all sentient beings; good is a realised life etc.
Almost every different ethical systematisation finds the Good to be embodied in a different place. For Sam, it is well-being. But critically, this isn’t a given.
That said, as a Humanist you aren’t confined to these systems per se. You’re right to account a privileged view of well-being (this is something that you can likely defend on evolutionary grounds). The only limit to this is that you aren’t granted the prescriptive force of an ethic.
Regardless though, you can still live compassionately amongst one another as Humanists. A possible solution is to leave prescriptive functions to the law and to reduce the ‘moral’ discourse into a support of certain values which will be beneficial to us. This can be defended on rather relativist or pragmatic grounds.
I think the important claim is just to realise that these positions won’t be Ethically justifiable, in a traditional sense.
It seems to me to be perfectly defensible to argue that IF behaving in certain ways is conducive to our survival then we OUGHT (ie we owe it to ourselves) to behave in such ways IF we want to survive.
But the question would become why is it good to survive?
I agree that it is a fair statement to say that if X is conducive to our survival and if Y wants to survive, then Y should do X (to the extent that it fulfils Y’s goals).
But that is a very different kind of statement than saying that you should do X because it is good.
The above is an example of the criticism Hume mounts (although slightly different in its form). But basically, to say that doing X fulfils Y doesn’t justify why Y should be fulfilled.
So to ground it more firmly, suppose we adopted the approach that you should act in a way conducive to your survival- because survival is what is valuable. Now suppose you come across someone who doesn’t value survival. You have no justification to pursued that individual that your moral prescriptions have any bearing on his actions. So the moral statements you make become meaningless- they can’t be justified and so their function is undermined.
Hello Mike and Sean
In many ways I am with you Sean- without an absolute goal or code morality cannot be defined. This argument though leaves the word morality, and ethic in an absolute sense as wholly redundant words- if morality is undefinable then it is not a word and does not exist at all. This can be the case and be fine as, as you say we have law and justice.
It kind of reminds me of Dostoyevsky when he says without God everything is permitted.
If this is the case what word do we use to describe how we choose to make decisions?
Mike, yeah I absolutely agree with you- The ought argument (Hume?) is always good, but it depends on your definition of morality on what this means.
Hey Graham,
Thanks again for the response.
I’m actually reading the brothers Karamazov at the moment! Actually, as a side note, it is incredible how much Dostoevsky has influenced continental, and even analytic, philosophy.
So I guess I have two points which I think relate to what you’re saying.
The first is that morality can still be a word, insofar as it relates to a history of ideas and claims. Only that to justify a morality, or a moral claim, is a very very tall order. One which requires certain beliefs & ideas which won’t be suitable to appeal to when you are working from a humanist world-view.
We might still speak of certain justify, and justify why we make them. Just if we are working in a scientific world-view, I would claim that we can’t make absolute value judgements.
– so, we can certainly make contingent claims. The classic example is that Graham is a good runner. A good runner is somebody who runs 100m is under 12 seconds. Graham runs 100m in 11.8 and is therefore a good runner.
– Similarly, we might also say that chocolate is better than vanilla. Because I prefer chocolate. What I can’t do is tell you to like chocolate.
So I’m saying that 1) Morality is still a term of use, just not coherent in the Humanist framework. 2) Humanists can still make value judgements, of course, only they will be contingent on other factors and so won’t have the ‘commanding’ quality that a traditional moral claim aspires to. Instead, we can justify our doing X because we aimed to achieve Y, rather than Z. But that would be a pragmatic claim, not a moral one.
Hello
Please to hear your reading the brothers karamazov- fantastic book, great author; possibly the best- I love tolstoy but his ethics are so firmly grounded in religion.
I wholeheartedly agree with your argument, it caused me some personal bother for a while; the feelin that there was no way of doing anything genuinely good, but I got over it haha.
All the best
Graham
Hi Sean
My moral stance is that we should act in a way that is conducive to the long-term survival prospects of those who value the mutual benefits of living in harmony with others in order to ensure our own wellbeing. I would suggest that we have evolved to recognise as morally good anyone who behaves in such a way – we can trust them to safeguard our welfare because it is in their own long-term interests to do so. They are free to reject such a value-system or to act against it but will risk the wrath and punishment of others if they do. ‘Good’ effectively means ‘good for us because it’s good for others’. And what is good for us is good because in some sense it enhances our feeling of well-being.
It seems to me (and I get this mostly from Ellis’s Rational-Emotive Behaviour Therapy) that we need to distinguish between conditional and unconditional Shoulds (Oughts, Musts etc.)
A conditional Ought might say “if you want to catch that train, you ought to be leaving the house now”. This is plainly not morality.
An unconditional Ought might say “you ought to respect other people’s rights”. This is morality but – alas! – it’s also meaningless and impotent. Where does this Ought come from? Who made this rule? Why Ought I to obey it?
What I do find in myself, however, is a collection of desires – I just do want this and just don’t want that. I am tempted to reframe these desires as morality, because that puts people who thwart me in the wrong. So, rich people argue that taxation is theft, and poor people argue that property is theft, and each imagines that their argument, if proved, would settle the matter once and for all. But that can only work by encouraging the irrational appeal to shame (as in, “you ought to be ashamed of yourself”. Ought I? Really? says who?
Yes, I want to ditch morality (in the sense of unconditional Oughts) and replace it with a system of conditional Oughts and positive law. I believe – based on the research that’s been done into Positive Psychology – that being generous and forgiving will give me a better shot at happiness than would being selfish and crabby. So, if I want to catch that train, I ought to be leaving the house now.
The distinction between catching trains and respecting rights is that morality is about actions that affect the well-being of others. The idea that one ought to respect rights is thus a tacit conditional right – that we ought to do so if we want others to respect our rights too. We owe the duty to them, but also to ourselves, since we benefit from living in social harmony with others and would probably have lost out in the struggle for existence if we had adopted a different moral code such as ‘cheat whenever you can’!