Our obfuscation on Islamism misses the mark and stigmatises all Muslims

November 19, 2015 by Guest author

In the wake of the tragic events in Paris last week, Jacob Kishere appeals for an honest and plain-speaking language when describing the dangers posed by religious fundamentalists.

Jean Jullien’s Eiffel tower peace symbol, which went viral on the Internet as a show of solidarity to the victims of the atrocity in Paris.

Before the bloodshed had even ended in Paris on Friday night fingers were already pointed; it is the perpetual blame game and all too familiar to the one seen 10 months prior in the wake of Charlie Hebdo. Since the spirit of unity was channelled worldwide in the hashtag #jesuischarlie, there has been an inadequacy in our political discourse on both sides which continually fails to address the threats we face.

Given the context of rising anti-Muslim bigotry, many on the left – who anticipate further backlashes – have called for calm, repeating the mantra that the jihadist epidemic has ‘nothing to do with Islam’. Meanwhile, increasingly enraged by the left’s perceived obfuscation on matters relating to Islam, figures on the right have adopted the position that Muslim populations are complicit in these atrocities, and proclaims these terror attacks the bloody result of failed multiculturalism. The consequences of both mutually inflammatory positions have been an increasingly toxic atmosphere in civil society toward Muslims and abject failure to stem the rising tide of radicalisation.

But if we are to do any justice to the victims of these countless ideologically driven attacks, the very least we can do is recognise that there is an ideology at play. That ideology is Islamism. Both left and right must recognise this in order to move forward. Well-intentioned leftists must end their blind defence of all things Islam and recognise that the ideology of Islamism has something to do with Islam. While it may be instinctive to the traditions of academic left to attribute jihadist action to western foreign policy and prevailing conditions of social desperation, neither the data nor our experiences support such reasoning.

As early as the 9/11 attacks we saw the propensity for wealthy, educated individuals to commit atrocities in the name of ideology, with many of the conspirators holding graduate level degrees. Bin Laden himself was the heir to one of the wealthiest families in Saudi Arabia. Far more revealing in his case is that he was tutored by Muhammad Qutb, brother of Sayed Qutb the ‘grandfather of Islamism’. For decades, funded by Saudi oil money and facilitated by Western governments favouring the most reactionary voices within communities as ‘leaders’, Islamist ideology has been directly imported into European communities. At present, Western Europe is reaping the seeds it has allowed to be sown by Islamists for 20 years in its communities through universities and other institutions. If anyone doubted the degree of the crises they need only consider the militants fighting in Syria from France numbering 1,200, from Belgium numbering 440, from Germany numbering between 500–600, and from the UK numbering around 600 (See International centre for the study of radicalisation and political violence, KCL) with many considering these estimates to be conservative.

At the same time, pundits on the political right must recognise that it is not Islam – the faith of billions – which drives jihadism in the west so much Islamism: the fundamentalist desire to impose any form of Islam over society.

It is often stated, and yet not enough, that the first victims of this ideology in any act of jihad are Muslims themselves. This is self-evident throughout the Arab World, and was again demonstrated brutally in the bloody Islamic State attacks in Lebanon which claimed the lives of around 43, just hours before violence erupted in Paris. Reactionaries must recognise that what they are witnessing is not a battle between a vaguely defined ‘West’ and the religion of Islam but a battle within Islam between that religion’s progressive reformers and its militant hardliners. It is only through empowering and working with the progressive reformist voices within communities that they will effectively counter Islamism. In the coming weeks, the straw man of refugees as a causal factor will inevitably be thrown up; but this too is a fiction. Those arriving on the shores of Europe are fleeing the very threat we now face at home.

Growing up in a post-9/11 Britain, I heard many times the repugnant sentiments that ‘not every Muslim is a terrorist, but every terrorist is a Muslim’. But as much as the left reviles such casual bigotry, it is very much the unintended consequence of the left’s language of obfuscation. Whole generation of Britons lack the vocabulary – the conceptual tools required — to properly articulate the nature of this threat they so fear. And if we as a society are to come together and address this common threat, we would be far better served in remembering this: not every Islamist is a jihadist, but every jihadist is an Islamist.

Jacob Kishere is a humanist and a student of history. He blogs on Medium at @JacobKishere.

To defeat Islamism, we must show that its narratives are false

September 15, 2015 by Guest author

Jacob Kishere looks at the narratives of oppression exploited by Islamists to portray an intense clash of civilisations.

Hate preacher Anjem Choudary. Photo credit: Dan H/Flickr

There has been rightful jubilation amongst Britons, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, at the arrest of Anjem Choudary after years of hate-baiting. As well as others, Choudary has been pictured with Michael Adebolajo, who along with Michael Adebowale was responsible for the brutal killing of Fusillier Lee Rigby in 2013.

However, Choudary, like many others, operated perfectly legitimately within the bounds of the law for many years before any sufficient evidence could be found to bring a prosecution under the Terrorism Act 2000. In the past decade it has become clear that what is needed to combat ‘radicalisation’ is not a solely top-down government response through departmental programs, but a comprehensive ‘civil society strategy’. A change in tact, which the Prime Minister recognised in his recent speech held in Birmingham on counter-extremism. Advocating a civil society response is distinct from rejecting all government action as being authoritarian in the way many so called ‘Muslim community’ advocacy groups have claimed in the past. Instead, it means government and society working in tandem. The facets of the civil society response have been covered extensively and debated in the press, in particular due to the recognition within political discourse of ideology as a driver of radicalisation thanks to organisations like Quilliam.

Having said that, despite this significant step of identifying the importance of Islamist ideologies in radicalisation, very little analysis has been given to what the ideology of Islamism actually consists of. This is the greatest shortcoming of the current discourse, not that we point to ideology, but that those activists, teachers and students best placed to challenge it in a robust ‘civil society response’ do not have the understanding or the tools to do so.

Manifesting what Quilliam has been calling for, the early seeds of a small but burgeoning ‘counter-extremism’ movement can be seen in the activism of Atheist, Humanist, and Secular student societies and increasingly from ex-Muslim groups. In addition to this, ‘Quilliam Societies’, which operate independently from the thinktank while sharing its philosophy, have been launched at universities across the UK by student activists to promote human rights and civil liberties. Crucial to these activists will be the ability to counter Islamist as well as far-right narratives that may be presented at campuses. Part of this will involve the ability to recognise the recurring themes, arguments and logical inconsistencies that they may present so that they can be forthright in their rebuttal. The public face of Islamism in the media, soft Islamism[i] as I will refer to it, often carries a veneer of intellectual integrity which presents arguments in favour of cohesion.

Firstly, historical narratives are frequent and consistent amongst speakers from organisations which are frequently invited onto campuses across the UK. Here a highly simplistic vision is painted which creates an ‘Islam and the West’ dichotomy. It argues that the Islamic world under a caliphate was ‘the height of civilisation’, citing how Islamic scholars preserved the works of Plato and Aristotle and are therefore responsible for the Enlightenment and the industrial revolution. The decline of the Arab Enlightenment is blamed on Western colonialism, in a narrative that runs as follows: After hundreds of years of Islamic history, the Ottoman Caliphate of the early 20^th century is dismantled by Western colonial powers, who were and remain diametrically opposed both to a caliphate and the exercise of political agency in the Islamic world. Symptomatic of most ideological paradises, the Islamic world is presented as having been essentially preserved in a time capsule of prosperity prior to Western intervention. Additionally, predominantly Sunni speakers and writers envision an entirely homogenous Middle East, free of nationalism or dissent. This of course ignores the presence of Shi’ites, Yazidis, as well as all other diversity in scholarly opinion, language, race, and culture in the Middle East prior to 1918.

Secondly, drawing heavily on anti-imperialist schools of thought and thinkers like Edward Said, most engagement with the topic of foreign policy through Islamism centres on neo-colonialism. 21st century doctrines of neo-conservatism and liberal interventionism present ideal evidence for neo-colonialism here. The interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan can thereby be seen in the prism of a one hundred year strategy by Western powers to undermine and ‘hold on’ the Middle East. This broad stroke characterisation of a century of foreign policy is especially difficult to counter since the majority of Britons in hindsight either oppose or hold substantial reservations about these interventions. It is perfectly possible to both oppose such interventions while also actively rejecting conspiracy theories. Islamism effectively blames ‘the West’ entirely, proposing that in the absence of Western involvement, ‘proper’ Islamic jurisprudence would bring about the perfect and just solution to all of the problems ailing the ‘Islamic world’. In dispensing with all responsibility of the Islamic world, today that old political cliché ‘this has nothing to do with Islam’ appears frequently, denying that any aspects of Islamic theology are in any way responsible at least in part for the actions of some.

Lastly, in order for Islamism to unify British Muslims behind its cause it must draw and exaggerate a dichotomy between Muslims and non-Muslims. As mentioned previously, this narrative serves to paint all Muslims as part of a unified block without dissent or diversity and equally the non-Muslim west – the kuffar – as its homogenous polar opposite. Often, the most deceptive speakers will pay brief and regular lip service to a select few in the mainstream media to assure audiences that they are not being bigoted. However, this aside fails to detract effectively from the pervasive narrative that there is an un-crossable chasm of difference between British Muslims and their fellow citizens. The reality of course is that there is a vast diversity of opinion in and between Western countries. Muslims in Western countries may well have far more in common with their non-Muslim countrymen than with other Muslims around the world. Islamic majority countries themselves host a spectrum of political and religious belief.

At this very moment the minds of young British students are being shaped by Islamist ideology, helping to create an environment which undermines social cohesion. Though we as a society cannot all afford to become scholars of Islamism, we equally cannot afford to remain ignorant of it. A wider basic understanding of the characteristics of this ideology will be the most effective way to create the kind of ‘robust democratic response’ that is needed to challenge such authoritarian beliefs.

Jacob Kishere is a humanist and a student of history. He blogs on Medium at @JacobKishere.

[i] Soft Islamism: refers to the ideology presented to the wider public by prominent Islamists. It does not explicitly call for a Caliphate or any imposition over society as in core tenets of organisations, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir. It instead uses obfuscation and suggestion to create an ideological basis for ‘purer’ forms of Islamism. An example of this is constant reference to the ‘Islamic Golden Age’, with the tangential inference being that a modern day caliphate, would re-create this constructed paradise.