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Archives for April 2015

What did the ruling in the London Oratory case actually mean?

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On Friday in the High Court, Justice Cobb handed down the latest judgment in the long-running saga that is the legal dispute over whether or not the London Oratory School’s admissions policy complies with the School Admissions Code. The case started just over two years ago when the British Humanist Association submitted an objection, and the latest decision pertained to the legality of a determination issued by the Office of the Schools Adjudicator (OSA) that was issued last summer. The school challenged ten different aspects of that determination.

Some parts of the press reported the judge’s decision as a ‘win’ for the Oratory, with the school describing its challenge as ‘successful’ and its head quoted as saying that ‘The Judge’s decision supports us in continuing to preserve the School’s ethos and serving Catholic families throughout the whole of London.’ But a thorough reading of the decision leads us to three different conclusions:

  1. The judge’s decision was, in our view, wrong in several places.
  2. At any rate, the school actually has largely lost the case, only generally winning in places that do not mean it can change its admissions policy back to what it was before the whole saga started.
  3. And even in places where the school won, the decision was often that the OSA’s reasoning was flawed. This does not necessarily mean the OSA’s conclusions were wrong and in fact in a few areas the judge ruled that a fresh decision must be taken – i.e. the case is not yet over yet.

So the school has really won very little at all.

 

In total the school was found by the OSA to break the Admissions Code in 105 different places. The school only challenged a handful of these, leaving the vast majority unperturbed. The main impetus for the school’s challenge was the decision that the school could no longer have a ‘Catholic service criterion’ as part of its admissions arrangements. This required three years of service to the Catholic church or other associated activities, with priority given on the basis of things like flower arranging. This was found to be uncompliant with the Code for a number of different reasons, including paragraphs 1.9e) (giving priority on the basis of practical support to a religious organisation), 1.9i) (taking into account religious activities not laid out as permitted by the school’s diocese), 1.8 (unfairly discriminating on the basis of ethnicity and social background) and 1.38 (not having had sufficient regard to the diocesan guidance).

In judicially reviewing the OSA’s decision, the school did not even challenge the finding with respect to paragraph 1.9e), so never had any hope of getting a ruling that fully contradicted the OSA’s decision in this area. On top of that, the school lost its challenge under paragraph 1.9i). This means that the main areas where the school won actually will have no impact on its admissions criteria: in effect it still has to change them in the way the OSA determined last year.

So we can see already that in the vast majority of cases, including with respect to the ‘Catholic service criterion’, the decision taken against the school has already been found to stand.

Beyond that, it is worth going through each of the school’s ten areas of challenge, with our three conclusions in mind.

(1) Failure to ‘have regard’ to the Diocesan Guidance

Paragraph 1.38 says that ‘Admission authorities for schools designated as having a religious character must have regard to any guidance from the body or person representing the religion or religious denomination when constructing faith-based oversubscription criteria’. The OSA found that the School had broken this, in part because ‘paragraph 1.38 is given greater force in relation to faith-based oversubscription criteria generally by paragraph 1.9i of the Code’, which says that the school must not ‘prioritise children on the basis of their own or their parents’ past or current hobbies or activities’, except when taking account of religious activities, as laid out by its diocese. If the school had properly had regard to the guidance, it would not have broken paragraph 1.9i).

In reaching his determination on this issue, however, Justice Cobb did not mention the role of 1.9i) at all (only considering it later under the school’s third challenge) and instead only focused on 1.38 and the meaning of ‘have regard to’, going through a range of relevant case law. Here he found that the OSA applied a too stringent test (in deciding that any reason for departing from the guidance must be ‘good’ and ‘compelling’), and therefore, while finding that ‘the School’s approach to the relevant test was also flawed’, he concluded that the OSA had not correctly found that 1.38 had been broken.

As a result he ruled that there will ‘need to be a further determination of the School’s approach to the Diocesan Guidance, its compliance with para.1.38 of the Admissions Code, and the adequacy of the reasons for departure, applying the appropriate test.’ So the school has not yet won here but only triggered a further case.

(2) Socio-economic discrimination

Paragraph 1.8 of the Code says that ‘Admission authorities must ensure that their arrangements will not disadvantage unfairly, either directly or indirectly, a child from a particular social or racial group.’

The London Oratory School is highly socio-economically selective. As we wrote in our paper which we submitted to the case in May 2014, the January 2013 School Census records that 6.6% of pupils are eligible for free school meals, compared with 38.7% in its middle super output area (i.e. immediate vicinity), 40.8% in the neighbouring MSOAs, 42% in its local authority, and 26.1% across London as a whole. The Fair Admissions Campaign’s map ranks this disparity between the school and its area as making it the ninth most socio-economically selective state secondary school in England.

Justice Cobb, however, starts off by agreeing with the adjudicator that there is ‘some inherent social selection of school candidates within the Catholic population as a whole’, before going on to find that ‘the data relied on by the School showed that six of the eight schools with similarly high percentages of Catholic pupils had similar levels of pupils entitled to free school meals to the School’. This, surely, simply shows that such discrimination is common amongst oversubscribed Catholic schools.

However, Justice Cobb also found that the adjudicator did not show that it was the faith-based oversubscription criteria that were causing this discrimination, nor that it was unfair. It seems to me to be quite obvious that if we first agree there is ‘some inherent social selection of school candidates within the Catholic population as a whole’, and then we select Catholics, then that faith-based selection is going to cause socio-economic discrimination. But no matter: the more significant point is that the decision did not address per se the conclusion that the school is socio-economically advantaged. It unambiguously is. It only found that the case had not been properly set out.

Finally, the school also argued that it was unfair that it had not seen the adjudicator’s evidence around socio-economic advantage prior to the determination. The judge agreed with this. I do not agree: 1. The BHA submitted such evidence during the course of the case, which the school chose not to look at; and 2. At any rate it is easily available in the public domain. The school should have been aware of these statistics; that it was not was negligent on its part.

(3) Catholic Service

To reiterate, paragraph 1.9i of the Code says that the school must not ‘prioritise children on the basis of their own or their parents’ past or current hobbies or activities’, except when taking account of religious activities, as laid out by its diocese. The judge correctly rejected the school’s challenge to the finding that the ‘Catholic service criterion’ breaks this paragraph. This essentially means that the success of challenges 1 and 2, above, are symbolic victories.

It is worth noting that the judge incorrectly states that the OSA ‘declined to state whether this criterion also breached para.1.9(e)’, when in fact the adjudicator did find that this paragraph was also broken.

(4) Catholicity: Parent or Parents

The fourth challenge by the school was to the OSA’s finding that its arrangements were unfair in requiring two Catholic parents to both be religiously observant.  The judge agreed with this finding with respect to the school’s 2014 admission arrangements. But he disagreed with respect to the 2015 arrangements due to the new statement in the 2015 arrangements that references to ‘parents’ should be read as ‘to one parent if the child resides with only one of the parents’. But this new statement does not deal with the case where the child has two Catholic parents but only one is observant: this child/observant parent is put at a disadvantage to a child who only has one Catholic parent. The judge got this wrong in a way that threatens the widely established principle that ‘faith’ schools can only require one parent to be religiously observant, something that is a very basic question of fairness. The Code might now need clarification.

(5) Request for parents’ baptismal certificates

The school asks for parents’ baptismal certificates. The OSA said that this breaks paragraph 2.4 of the Code where it says that the school must not ask for ‘any personal details about parents and families, such as maiden names’ – as maiden names will be revealed by baptismal certificates. But the judge ruled that 2.4 ‘is not to be read in such a way that would place a Governing Body in the position of being unable to apply a legitimate oversubscription criterion in practice just because it was prevented from requiring the necessary evidence’ – and therefore the request could stand. I do not agree that this is a correct reading of 2.4 and think the Code could now do with being clarified.

However, the judge also writes that this part of the decision is dependent upon the ultimate outcome of challenge (1) above, i.e. ‘is dependent on a future finding that there is a clear and proper reason for departing from the Guidance in these respects’ – as if the school did not have good reason from departing from the diocesan guidance in this area, then the oversubscription criterion is not legitimate so paragraph 2.4 does in fact apply. So this is only a preliminary finding.

(6) Previous Catholic education

In its arrangements the school gave priority to those attending Catholic primaries in 2014, and then those having received a Catholic education (including through primaries) in 2015.

Paragraph 1.9b) says that schools must not ‘take into account any previous schools attended, unless it is a named feeder school’. Paragraph 1.15 adds that ‘The selection of a feeder school or schools as an oversubscription criterion must be transparent and made on reasonable grounds.’ The school was found to break both of these paragraphs of the Code.

The judge upheld the decision with respect to 1.15, but overturned it with respect to 1.9b) on the basis of the reasoning that ‘the primary information sought from the candidate’s parent(s) is whether the candidate has attended a Catholic School (not which school), even though the name of the school is requested as proof of that education’. This seems to me to be an extremely strange reading of 1.9b) – taking into account a type of school (e.g. all Catholic schools) is still taking into account previous schools attended, even if the specific individual schools are not taken into account. Perhaps the Code now needs clarifying in this area.

The judge also writes that ‘there is no prohibition within the Admissions Code… upon a Governing Body asking the name of previous schools’. But paragraph 2.4 says that schools must only ‘request additional information when it has a direct bearing on decisions about oversubscription criteria’. So in fact there is such a prohibition.

At any rate, this is again a departure from the diocesan guidance, and the judge again writes that this part of the decision is dependent upon the ultimate outcome of challenge (1) above, i.e. ‘is dependent on a future finding that there is a clear and proper reason for departing from the Guidance in these respects’. So again this is only a preliminary finding. But what is more the school sought to justify its taking into account Catholic education by reference to canon law. Therefore such consideration plainly falls under the remit of paragraph 1.9i). It is not laid out as permitted by the diocese for a school to take into account Catholic education as a religious activity. This fact is not discussed in the judgment and could well be grounds for a future successful challenge to the school’s admissions arrangements, if such a criterion continues to have a place in them.

(7) Choristers

(8) Statement of ‘Medical and social need’ on Religious Inquiry Form

(9) Parents’ signature(s)

These three challenges concerned points of clarity and the judge concluded that the OSA’s determination was fine. However in the third (allowing two parents to sign the form) he wrote that the adjudicator’s determination ‘verges on the pedantic’. I do not agree: as a matter of fairness it is important that schools make clear throughout that only one parent is considered in religious oversubscription criteria.

(10) Consultation on admissions criteria

The last issue related to whether or not the school consulted parents of 2 to 18 year olds, which is required by the Code and regulations. The OSA wrote that the school had ‘no evidence … which … constitutes a meaningful attempt to bring the school’s proposed arrangements to the attention of the group in question’. The judge did not agree with this, and so quashed this part of the decision, but did agree that insufficient steps had been taken and so rejected the school’s reasoning. This therefore is a partial victory for the school at best.

Conclusion

As can be seen, therefore, in almost every case where the school won, the victory was partial, temporary, and/or of no practical consequence. In this light the school’s statement that the judgement was a great victory on its part was erroneous. This fact should be reflected in its subsequent admissions arrangements.

Polls consistently show we’re not a religious country. So why don’t our politicians get it?

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The numbers are in (and have been for a while). Can politicians really keep insisting this is a 'Christian country'? Photo: Chris Combe.

The numbers are in (and have been for a while). Can politicians really keep insisting this is a ‘Christian country’? Photo: Chris Combe.

Elected officials to this day continue to cite the Census to make the point that Britain is a ‘Christian country’ or a country made up principally of Christians. The Census statistic of 59% is used to justify all sorts of privileges granted to the religious in Britain today, including the widespread handing over of public services and schools to religious control and the place of unelected bishops in our legislature, not to mention the recurrent exceptionalising of Christian contributions to our shared cultural life. But is that statistic true? Is it any good?

The likely answer is no, and any demographer can tell you why. By asking the leading question  ‘What is your religion?’ in the context of a series of questions about ethnicity and cultural background, the Census leads to higher numbers of people identifying themselves with their family or cultural religious background, and for the most part not with that they actually believe, feel they belong to, or practise.

The Census statistic is used to justify all sorts of privileges granted to the religious in Britain today. But is it any good?

Most other rigorous surveys will tell you a different story – the story of a very diverse Britain united for the most part by common values which straddle the ‘religious divide’. The most recent of these surveys was by YouGov this April, and it found that around two thirds of Britons, when asked, would say they are ‘not religious’.

The April poll, commissioned by the Sunday Times, asked the question ‘Would you describe yourself as being a practicing member of a religion?’ and found that 62% of the general public said ‘no’. Christianity polled as the second most popular option, accounting for 33% of the public. And it’s by no means a one-off. Most polls of the last decade have given very similar results.

This majority ‘not religious’ figure has been found repeatedly in recent years. A recent example of this trend is the Survation poll last November, which asked ‘Do you consider yourself religious or not religious?’ and found that 60.5% of Brits are the latter. These figures are in turn consistent with year-on-year polling from the British Social Attitudes Survey, which finds that around or slightly over half of the population is in fact non-religious (and that 42% Brits identify as Christian) when it asked ‘1. Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion? 2: If yes: which?’. A YouGov poll in April 2014 also found that 50% of Brits were non-religious, and that three quarters of the population were ‘not religious or not very religious’. Very similar results in 2011 and 2012, and numerous others, overwhelmingly reinforce the pattern.

We can say with some confidence that half of Brits are non-religious

Equally, the one third figure for believing Christians has been found time and time again. A YouGov poll for the Times in February this year found that only 55% of British Christians ‘believed in God,’ bringing the total proportion down from 49% of Britons who say they are Christian to around 23% for ‘Christians who believe in God’.  A 2013 YouGov poll which asked how many people in Britain believed in the central tenet of Christianity – that Jesus of the Nazareth was the son of God – found a figure of 30%. It’s that same figure again – around a third

In most aspects of their jobs, politicians look closely at these sorts of surveys when making policy decisions, or when attempting to win over new voters with popular initiatives. They know, and statisticians can tell you why, that the margin of error on these things is usually around 1-3%. So I feel we can say with some confidence that half of Brits are non-religious (only 4% of ‘nones’, according to the Times/YouGov 2015 poll, ‘believe in a god’) and that beyond that, two thirds are ‘not religious’ – in the sense of not seeing religion as very important or not practising. It’s a widespread trend: only 30% of Brits are believing Christians, and only 6% or fewer Brits go to church on a given Sunday.

Much more importantly, three quarters of Brits say they are opposed to public policy decisions being influenced by religion

The Census result would suggest that three quarters or more of Brits, cutting across the religious divide, would cite some sort of Christian cultural background, but this is a broad group indeed – both Justin Welby and Professor Richard Dawkins would say they are culturally Christian! Much more importantly, three quarters of Brits say they are opposed to public policy decisions being influenced by religion – with 92% of Christians agreeing that the law should apply equally regardless of religion.

Politicians trotting out the old Census figure to justify handouts or, engaged in cynical vote-grabbing, should remember that most of us want to be treated equally and want a level playing field – including by opposing ingrained religious privilege, such as by opposing  ‘faith’ schools and bishops in the House of Lords. Of course, politicians are not won over by opinion polls alone, and most are wary of the power of religious institutions, whose views tends to be a bit more traditional than those of their flocks. But change is inevitable, and on the way – the fact that the next generation rising through the ranks is overwhelmingly non-religious could well promise to erode the power of churches over our elected representatives.

Is it appropriate to use churches as polling stations?

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The 2015 general election on 7 May looks closer than ever and contentious issues around religion are clear political skirmishing grounds. In light of this, should churches still house ballot boxes? The research suggests not, argues Adam Coomer.

Polling station by Christopher Brown EDITED bw bad weather

Both location and weather can alter voting intention, say researchers. Photo: Christopher Brown.

Bunting hung and the airwaves crowded with opinion, prediction, and analysis. Television schedules adjusted. Bus-loads of young men and women wearing tribal colours. If you’re reading this post from an archive then you might think that I’m referring to the World Cup, but I’m actually referring to the 2015 general election campaign.

Many of us will by now have received polling cards advising those of us not making use of postal voting of where we need to attend on 7 May. Many of these locations will be churches. (The first draft of this post actually read ‘places of worship’, although I was unable to find any examples of non-Christian facilities being used). As issues to do with how religion should intersect with public life become more relevant to politicians and to the electorate, it may be time to reconsider whether houses of faith are suitable for this purpose.

In the life of the current Parliament, major debates have taken place regarding same-sex marriage, immigration, and the future of the House of Lords, where to do this day 26 Church of England bishops hold reserves seats by right of being clergy. In February, a collection of influential Anglican figures published an open letter proclaiming it to be ‘the duty of every Christian adult to vote’. This will not represent the view of every Anglican (let alone every Christian) any more than will the declaration by controversial Muslim cleric Anjem Choudary that voting is ‘sinful’ under Islamic law (accompanied by frigidly uncreative hashtag #StayMuslimDontVote). The clear point is that both religious issues and groups are significantly in play as polling day approaches. It can hardly assist those in disagreement with Choudary that some undecided Muslim voters will inevitably receive, as I did last week, polling cards instructing them to attend a local Christian church. This less speaks than mumbles of inclusive democracy.

Polling in religious buildings potentially risks alienating those of other faiths (and none), but this is only one aspect. A second and better examined question is whether polling location can actually influence how a voter marks their ballot. Social scientists and marketers well understand that human behaviour, choice and attitude can be influenced by the unconscious influence of the environment: a phenomenon known as priming. This occurs because the stimuli in question act on the subconscious and promote the access of closely associate memories and, as such, the effects tend to be unpredictable and unique to each individual. In the constitutionally secular United States, there has been a renewed enthusiasm for investigating these influences on voting decisions since the controversially close Presidential election of 2000.

Election outcomes have been shown to be influenced by a wide range of subtle factors, from the design of the ballot paper to the weather conditions on polling day. The first set of studies to look specifically at the influence of polling location were published by Stanford University researchers in 2006. These showed that those voting in schools were more likely to support a tax increase to fund education. Further studies specific to churches were published in 2010 and 2014. The first study suggested that voting in churches may be ‘advantageous to politically conservative candidates and to supporters of conservative positions on abortion, same-sex marriage, and other relevant issues’. However, the latter paper found the inverse, with those voting in churches more likely to support a proposition on same-sex marriage, which the researchers speculatively suggest may be due to negative campaigning on the issue by religious groups. Intriguingly, those voting in schools were also more likely to support marriage equality, whilst voters using municipal buildings (fire and police stations, community halls, and the like) were least in favour. The original Stanford researchers concluded that: ‘The magnitude of the influence of polling location on voting found here would be more than enough to change the outcome of a close election,’ a finding endorsed throughout the literature.

Objection to the use of churches as polling stations need not be based on anti-religious sentiment, but sensibly motivated by a desire for unbiased elections. Evidently, it is not even pre-determined in what manner the church environment might influence the undecided voter, but that there is some effect seems plain. If it is the case that mainly Christian facilities are used – and it seems likely that this is so – then what message does this send to non-Christians? Few are likely to further investigate the topic or understand that the officers selecting such buildings have a broad discretion, rather than compulsion.

As elections become closer and the traditional ‘Westminster henhouse’ becomes more colourful and claustrophobic, we can scarcely afford to be ignorant towards any unconscious influence inherent to the very mechanics of the process. While the perfect polling-day voter is balanced, well researched and pre-decided, they are extremely rare for the same reasons. Many people will attend on 7 May without a clear plan of how to vote – people protected from last-minute influence by exclusions placed on campaigners or materials in the vicinity of the polling station, and by a general prohibition on party-political clothing or paraphernalia on site. All of these rules are seem to be ignorant of that fact that the very room in which the process takes place may have the final say.

Under the parliamentary election rules, acting returning officers have broad discretion over the location of polling venues, with the right to use without charge any premises paid for (partly or fully) out of rates. These include schools and council premises – themselves fraught with problems. Beyond this there seem to be few rules and little guidance. Perhaps, in the circumstances, this should be reconsidered.

Adam Coomer is a member of the BHA’s Young Humanists and postgraduate student with University College London, with particular interests in law, religion and economics. Follow him on Twitter at @AdamMCoomer.

 

References

Berger, J.; Meredith, M. & Wheeler, S.C., ‘Can Where People Vote Influence How They Vote?  The Influence of Polling Location Type on Voting Behavior’ (2006), Stanford GSB Research Paper No. 1926 (DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.890660).

Berger, J.; Meredith, M. & Wheeler, C.S., ‘Contextual Priming: Where People Vote Affects How They Vote’ (2008) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 105 (26), 8846-8849.

Blumenthal, J.A. & Turnipseed, T.L., ‘Is Voting in Churches (or Anywhere Else) Unconstitutional?: The Polling Place Priming (PPP) Effect’ (2010), Boston University Law Review, Vol. 91, 2011.

Pryor, B.; Morehouse Mendez, J. & Herrick, R. ‘Let’s Be Fair: Do Polling Locations Prime Votes?’ (2014) J Pol Sci Pub Aff 2:126.; (DOI: 10.4172/2332-0761.1000126).

Rutchick, A.M., ‘Deus Ex Machina: The Influence of Polling Place on Voting Behavior’ (2010), Political Psychology, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2010 (DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9221.2009.00749.x)

Series warriors: In defence of our television addiction

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Ben Greenhalgh justifies our fascination with stories on the small screen.

Do you suffer from TV addiction? Photo: Lars Ploughmann

Do you suffer from TV addiction? Photo: Lars Ploughmann

The door creaks open and you emerge, still grasping the duvet that you have failed to part from for days. It’s stained, ridden with crumbs and stinks like stale beer. With your square eyed comrades following cautiously behind you, your eyes strain to adjust to the new world.  Your legs are weak from lack of use, your bladder exhausted from putting off trips to the toilet at important plot points. Your mouth is dry, and you’ve forgotten how to speak for the first few seconds until you utter the catch phrase of a generation: “I can’t wait for the next one!”

These symptoms point to a clear diagnosis of series addiction. It’s contagious to say the least; yet, I happily get infected.

There can be no doubt that we are a nation that loves our TV. Conversations surrounding certain well known shows frequently make their way into the social symposium. So much so, a recent study by Sky Atlantic showed the pressure to be in the know with the latest must-see shows, or keep up with the workplace chat that surrounds them, has led to millions of people faking their way through conversations rather than be seen to be out of the loop. This to me is fantastic. People want to share the storytelling experience with others, and it couldn’t come at a better time.

There are of course those who lambast such reliance upon screens: ‘Watching too much TV and films is a waste of valuable time: a slovenly and hedonistic pursuit with little merit!’ They shout that our brains will turn to mush, we will fail to form real social relationships, forget how to read, how to write, and will eventually become puddles of inanimate pointlessness. Personally, I think such people watch too much science fiction.

Although the written word will always maintain its pride of place beside humanity as the most powerful form of artistry, time changes: books have become just a part of our vast entertainment culture. Being in front of the box is a fundamental piece of our pleasure palate, and, if supplied with enough crisps and sweets, we can devour episodes and films with equal zeal, because, at the heart of each show or episode, is our human thirst for story.

Our need for story is seemingly inherent within our very biology: even when we dream we tell stories to ourselves. The reason is summed up beautifully by critic Kenneth Burke: ‘stories are equipment for living’.

As a species, we should constantly be questioning things, especially that of established norm. We need to persistently reinvent, challenge and adapt in order to better ourselves and the society we choose to create for ourselves and others.  Arguably, the most important question we ask ourselves towards this end was posed in Aristotle’s ‘Ethics’: how should a person live their life?

The factual answer eludes us of course, somehow hidden behind the wildfires of life where we find ourselves in a constant struggle to match our means with our dreams. Traditionally, humankind has made it the task of wisdom in the forms of philosophy, science, religion, and art to answer this ultimate question. Instead of coming up with answers, we have taken parts of each to bolster and create a liveable meaning, often resulting in conflict through disagreements on how much of each wisdom plays a role in forming just societies. I can think of one in particular. However, as our reliance upon this traditional wisdom diminishes, we continue to look to a source we still believe in, the art of story; the art of learning from the collective experience of humanity.

The best shows do not simply deal with entertaining us. Entertainment and enjoyment comes from our understanding of the characters, our empathy with them and their choices within the events of the story. We condemn and support these choices: actively discuss them with others as a way of learning about, not only our own moral outlook, but others as well. We learn from the characters’ mistakes and successes, we follow them through their trials and see them emerge on the other side failed or triumphant, mirroring our own transformation once the drama has ended.

Stories, whatever their medium, aren’t simply a flight from reality as some believe them to be; they are vehicles carrying us along in our search for reality so we are better equipped to make sense of the chaos of life.

Stories are finding explosive growth in modern society, and within series alone, that many of us follow dutifully,  we are offered a communal way of understanding parts of the human experience aside from shrinking dogmatic ideology that once acted alone to create meaningful existence. The more we watch and question these tales as a society, the more we question the world around us.

So, when you eventually crawl out from some dark hole after a 10-hour binge of The Walking Dead, think of it more as a philosophical lesson: an entertaining debate into your own power as an individual, and a closer understanding of the trials and tribulations of that individual within society.  Have a shower and some proper food though; that’s good for you too.

Ben Greenhalgh is a philosopher and writer. He works full time as a tutor for vulnerable young people who cannot be educated within mainstream education.